European Works Councils during the financial and economic crisis: Activation, stagnation or disintegration? by Mählmeyer, Valentina et al.
www.ssoar.info
European Works Councils during the financial
and economic crisis: Activation, stagnation or
disintegration?
Mählmeyer, Valentina; Rampeltshammer, Luitpold; Hertwig, Markus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mählmeyer, V., Rampeltshammer, L., & Hertwig, M. (2017). European Works Councils during the financial and
economic crisis: Activation, stagnation or disintegration? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 23(3), 225-242.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680116685951
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Mählmeyer, Valentina; Rampeltshammer, Luitpold; Hertwig, Markus
Article  —  Published Version
European Works Councils during the financial
and economic crisis: Activation, stagnation or
disintegration?
European Journal of Industrial Relations
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Mählmeyer, Valentina; Rampeltshammer, Luitpold; Hertwig, Markus
(2017) : European Works Councils during the financial and economic crisis: Activation,
stagnation or disintegration?, European Journal of Industrial Relations, ISSN 1461-7129, Sage,
Thousand Oaks, CA, Vol. 23, Iss. 3, pp. 225-242,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959680116685951
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173969
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680116685951
European Journal of
Industrial Relations
2017, Vol. 23(3) 225 –242
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1 77/095 6801 6 859
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejd
European Works Councils 
during the financial and 
economic crisis: Activation, 
stagnation or disintegration?
Valentina Mählmeyer
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Germany
Luitpold Rampeltshammer
Universität des Saarlandes, Germany
Markus Hertwig
Technische Universität Chemnitz, Germany
Abstract
The article compares changes in the European Works Councils (EWCs) at Ford and General 
Motors Europe during the financial and economic crisis. Previously, both were highly active and 
effective. Although both otherwise displayed quite different characteristics before the crisis, their 
reactions were quite similar. At both companies, competition and mistrust among representatives 
increased, resulting in a decline of integration and effectiveness. We explore the importance of 
personal relations as preconditions for stability and effectiveness in EWCs.
Keywords
Automotive industry, European Works Councils, financial and economic crisis, Ford, General 
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Introduction
Critical incidents like company crises can have different effects on employees and repre-
sentative bodies such as unions and works councils. They may encourage new forms of 
collective representation or trigger greater activity by existing bodies (Katz and Kochan, 
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2000; Marginson et al., 2001; Whittall et al., 2008). Crises, it has been argued, breed a 
growing need to organize, and under certain conditions employees recognize the poten-
tial of collective representation to articulate their interests (Hertwig et al., 2011; 
Kerckhofs, 2015; Kotthoff, 2007; Müller et al., 2004). With regard to cross-border rep-
resentation, the case of General Motors Europe (GME) illustrates how a European Works 
Council (EWC) can become a powerful actor when facing management threats of reloca-
tion and redundancies (Banyuls et al., 2008). Conversely, crisis may also disrupt existing 
representational practice. Studies of EWCs have shown that crisis may generate conflicts 
and lead to disintegration, ‘parochialism’ or ‘localism’ (Hancké, 2000). Such findings 
point to the fragile nature of cross-border employee representation.
Our article analyses how two EWCs reacted to the financial and economic crisis, 
which for many companies posed novel challenges. In the automotive sector, it threat-
ened at least the low-price segment of the industry, mostly in Western countries. In con-
trast to previous incidents of restructuring, the crisis not only put pressure on individual 
production locations but also affected many facilities at once and different business units 
such as logistics, marketing, sales and sometimes even research and development. The 
strategies adopted by managements certainly created a strong need for EWCs to become 
active and better organized, but were they actually able to cope with the challenges?
We compare the EWCs at Ford Europe and GME (the latter known as the Europe 
Employee Forum, or EEF) over the period between 2007 and 2011. We pursue two ques-
tions: ‘How did the EWCs change during the crisis’ and ‘Which factors account for the 
changes?’ We aim to improve understanding of the factors that promote or hinder cross-
border employee representation. Management in each company chose different strate-
gies to cope with the crisis; these certainly created a growing need for the EWC to 
organize and respond but did not automatically lead to activation or increased effective-
ness. The developments we observed can be explained by different factors: (1) shifts in 
management structures and strategies (restructuring, whip-sawing); (2) internal EWC 
developments (changes in personnel and orientations, erosion of trust); and (3) actor 
strategies (local as against European negotiations, plant egoism). We find an overall pes-
simistic picture; in both cases, the crisis exerted a centrifugal force, leading to disintegra-
tion and ineffectiveness. Hence, neither EWC succeeded in facilitating employee 
representation as effectively as before the crisis.
Below, we first review how previous research has explained changes in EWCs and 
their handling of crises. We then present our methodology and give brief descriptions of 
the companies and their EWCs before the crisis. After analysing and comparing the 
effects of the crisis on the companies and their EWCs, we conclude by suggesting some 
theoretical and practical implications.
What influences EWC structures, activities and outcomes?
Previous studies show that EWCs vary considerably in their activities and their success 
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Lecher et al., 2001; Marginson et al., 2004; 
Waddington, 2011). While some are marginalized (e.g. as simple ‘tools’ for the distribu-
tion of selected information), others have become powerful actors at European level. 
Some have succeeded in influencing management decisions through negotiations, 
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exceeding the competences prescribed in the directive. Beyond their direct interaction 
with management, EWCs have proved beneficial by offering representatives a ‘space’ to 
meet, coordinating national or local representatives and providing added value to 
employees from countries with inferior labour relations systems by opening an informa-
tion channel to top management.
However, studies have also shown that where solidarity and capacity to act are estab-
lished, they may be difficult to maintain. Scholars have pointed to trade-offs between 
transnational and local representation and to cases where transnational coordination 
failed or was used to benefit only a section of employees, as in BMW/Rover (Tuckman 
and Whittall, 2006). Unions and employee representatives may also avoid cooperative 
relationships when the goals of individual groups (unions or national representatives) 
can be achieved through national negotiations or when local solutions appear more ben-
eficial (Hancké, 2000). On the other hand, transnational union cooperation has been 
sparked in large part by collective threats (Bernaciak, 2013; Streeck, 1997).
While previous research has not clearly defined the ‘effectiveness’ of a EWC, it 
appears from the literature to denote the degree to which employee participation is 
achieved at the European level. From our point of view, EWCs with a high ‘output’ are 
those which have concluded agreements, as at Volkswagen, GME and Ford (Banyuls 
et al., 2008; Fetzer, 2008a). Yet, it has been argued that one has to distinguish between 
activity and outcome, and that both have to be evaluated on the basis of the ‘need to 
organize’ (Hertwig et al., 2011). To illustrate, the EWC at GME achieved a high level of 
activity, given the multiplicity of challenges management posed through permanent 
whip-sawing (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012); however, compared to the Ford EWC 
(FEWC), it appears less ‘efficient’ since the former concluded a larger number of sub-
stantive agreements with less activity and considerably lower pressure to organize 
(Hauser-Ditz et al., 2013).
Much previous research has examined individual EWCs, and explanations of their 
activities and output tend to be case-specific. In several studies, a mixture of factors has 
been identified. In the case of GME, for example, studies have noted the existence of a 
European management level, overcapacities and parallel production, trade union sup-
port, a learning process among EWC members and the strong national system of German 
labour relations to explain how this EWC became a ‘bargaining actor’ (Banyuls et al., 
2008). Fetzer (2008a) uses a notion of ‘risk communities’, unified by ‘a shared sense of 
vulnerability’ arising from a common and evenly spread threat of restructuring.
In their review of these accounts, Hauser-Ditz et al. (2010) offer a fivefold ‘typology’ 
of factors that were found to explain the structures, activities and outcome of EWCs. 
First, the multinational corporation (MNC) in which the EWC exists is its pivotal envi-
ronment and at the same time the subject and counterpart of its activities (Pries, 2008). 
Research has shown that the company structures and the strategies management pursues 
have a huge impact (Marginson et al., 2004). In GME, whip-sawing strategies of parallel 
production and inter-plant competition strengthened EWC activity significantly.
Second, cultural and institutional factors such as national labour relations, custom and 
practice or corporate culture have been highlighted (Gilman and Marginson, 2002; 
Lecher et al., 2001; Marginson et al., 2004). Differences in the views and expectations of 
actors may vary by nation, company or occupational background (Scott, 2001); so, for 
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example, country-of-origin-effects influence the attitudes and expectations of both man-
agers and representatives towards the EWC.
Third, EWCs may follow developmental paths or trajectories. As they constitute 
social systems of their own, they possess inertia; but they are also shaped by events like 
major conflicts or significant structural changes (Müller et al., 2004). Path dependency 
also stems from actors’ experiences and from learning effects. For example, at Ford, the 
Visteon split-off triggered an initial activation that has characterized the EWC for nearly 
a decade (Mählmeyer, 2011).
Fourth, many studies have shown that individual actors, their commitment and 
engagement make a difference. At GME and Ford, it has been reported that the election 
of a committed chair contributed to the emergence of solidarity, which in turn formed the 
basis for effective employee representation. In contrast, many EWCs have remained pas-
sive when there was no such ‘driving force’ to take the lead.
The final factor involves the specific relations and interaction patterns among EWC 
members (Gold and Rees, 2013). Several studies depict how a shared vision or ‘European 
identity’ emerges, that guides the thinking and acting of EWC members, facilitating soli-
darity and a capacity to act collectively vis-a-vis management (Telljohann, 2009; 
Timming, 2006; Whittall et al., 2007).
The impact on EWCs of the financial and economic crisis has not yet been widely 
addressed (Hertwig, 2015). Pernicka et al. (2014), in their analysis of the changes within 
the GME EEF since 2008, show that it has clearly suffered from restructuring; yet, soli-
darity and shared norms survived. Kerckhofs (2015) finds that most companies were 
‘only indirectly affected by the crisis’ but had to deal with continuous restructuring that 
started before the crisis. In a survey of different countries, Koukiadaki et al. (2016) have 
analysed labour market measures and changes in industrial relations after the crisis. 
While not specifically referring to EWCs, they differentiate three possible paths: ‘shock’ 
(which causes breaks in path dependency), ‘revelation’ (which highlights previously 
latent policy solutions) and ‘acceleration’ (intensification of existing trends).
Concerning company restructuring, a number of earlier studies have shown that 
EWCs have only limited leverage on management decisions, and that actors sometimes 
do not perceive it as desirable to deal with issues at the transnational level (Carley and 
Hall, 2006; Erne, 2008).
Measuring and explaining changes in EWCs
To analyse the changes in the two EWCs, we draw on the fivefold concept of explana-
tory factors sketched above and outlined in Figure 1. In order to identify changes sys-
tematically, we employ a schema that distinguishes between EWC structures, on the 
one hand, and activities or coordination patterns, on the other. This approach appears to 
be helpful because it allows us to ‘gauge’ EWCs and trace changes in structures and 
activities over time.
The structure of a EWC can be depicted by analysing how resources, power and cul-
ture are distributed among its spatially spread members (Hertwig et al., 2011).Resources 
concern the distribution of seats within the EWC and its steering committee, access 
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to budgets, information or strategic knowledge. Power refers to decision-making compe-
tences (Who sets the meeting agenda? Who determines strategies?). Culture refers to its 
specific set of values and norms, views and expectations of a EWC (Whittall et al., 2007). 
When (many) EWC members share a common vision, similar expectations and views 
concerning its basic goals, and act according to its implicit rules, cultural properties are 
found to be unique and strong; conversely, heterogeneous views and interests character-
ize a weak culture.
Coordination patterns include the number of general and steering committee meet-
ings; the level and quality of formal and informal communication in between official 
meetings; the activities of special working groups; and the ability to develop strategies 
and collective action. For example, activation may come with an increase in the amount 
or quality of regular communication among EWC members. Especially in crisis situa-
tions, members may communicate and interact more frequently and hold special meet-
ings (Waddington, 2011).
From the coordination patterns, we distinguish the actual output or achievements of a 
EWC. We focus on two issues. First, interacting with management and participating in 
company decisions (achieving access to information about company restructuring and 
management strategies; being able to articulate ‘voice’, the opinions of employees from 
different locations; and bargaining and signing binding agreements with management) 
Figure 1. Typology of factors influencing EWC structures, activities and outcomes.
Source: Adapted from Hertwig et al. (2011).
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and, second, facilitating interaction among EWC members (facilitating exchange of 
information and views; achieving common views, strategies and EWC identity).
The data presented stem from two research studies, which dealt with EWCs in large 
automotive companies. In each project, interviews were conducted between 2007 and 
2013 with management, EWC members from different locations and trade union offi-
cials, using semi-structured questionnaires. The interviews lasted between 30 and 120 
minutes and were transcribed and analysed. Table 1 shows the interviews (n = 31) that 
were used for our comparison of two EWCs. At GME, we interviewed the HR manager, 
14 EWC members and its secretary, and a local works council secretary; at Ford, the HR 
manager, 10 EWC members and its secretary, and 2 trade union officials.
We also analysed EWC agreements, company documents and press releases. Based 
on our preliminary results, we drafted short papers on each company which we sent to 
some of the interview partners for comment. We received a number of responses that 
were included in the final analysis. The results were also presented to interview partners 
and experts in the field during workshops. In some cases, repeat interviews were con-
ducted over several years in order to obtain information about changes that occurred 
during the crisis. Triangulation was achieved by comparing statements from different 
interviewees and by asking for clarification during repeat interviews.
Two US-based carmakers and EWCs on the eve of the 
crisis
GME and the EEF
General Motors (GM) has a long history in Europe: from the 1920s on, GM has invested 
in Europe, first by taking over the brands Opel in Germany and Vauxhall in the United 
Kingdom. During the 1960s, GM established new factories in Belgium, later in Spain, 
Portugal and Germany. After the implosion of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
GM expanded to Poland, Hungary and started a joint venture in Russia. In 1989, GM also 
acquired a partial ownership of the Swedish car producer Saab and wholly owned it 10 
years later. At the end of the 1980s, Opel was the leading brand in Western Europe. 
Subsequently, GME had been facing a ‘permanent crisis’ since the 1990s in its European 
business operations. The main reason for this development lies in the change of manage-
ment strategies, which focussed much more than before on short-term returns, at the 
Table 1. Interviews (between 2007 and 2013).
Company GME Ford
Management 1 (HR) 1 (HR)
EWC members 14 10
Other  2  3
(EWC secretary, local 
WC secretary)
(1 EWC secretary,  
2 trade union officials)
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expense of product quality, innovation and new technologies (Haipeter, 2006: 618). 
Second, especially in the low-price segment, new competitors from Asia emerged and 
gained market shares in Europe (Schmid, 2006). Third, GME was never able to get into 
the premium segment of high-quality and high price products. Fourth, the internationali-
zation strategy of GM focussed on the presence of the company in all important markets, 
so that export strategies of GME to expanding markets (e.g. the United States or the 
emerging markets) were precluded (Hauser-Ditz et al., 2013: 202f.). The main focus of 
GME, therefore, lay in the saturated European market. In 1990, GM sold more than 1.6 
million cars in Europe. This figure dropped steadily to 1.0 million by 2013 (European 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), n.d.) as a result of the developments 
stated above.
GME management reacted to the crisis with various adaptations and restructuring 
programmes, notably closing the Azambuja plant in 2006, outsourcing its own compo-
nent supplier Delphi and a joint venture with Fiat. Other cost-cutting measures were 
taken to reduce labour costs: the main strategy has been to encourage direct competition 
between production locations (Dehnen and Rampeltshammer, 2011).
The precarious economic situation of GME from the 1990s and 2000s significantly 
affected the early years of the EEF, founded on 16 September 1996 (the same day as the 
FEWC). From the beginning, management tried to play off employee representatives 
from individual production sites against each other; this strategy succeeded, as many 
national employment pacts were concluded. Employee initiatives to negotiate European-
wide agreements were rejected. The overall climate within the EEF was thus marked by 
distrust and competition among the employee representatives from different countries 
and locations, which contributed to a downward spiral of concessions (Hancké, 2000; 
Kotthoff, 2006).
Interconnected processes led to fundamental changes in the EEF during the years that 
followed. The head of the German group works council Klaus Franz, elected EEF chair 
in 2000, laid emphasis on trust-building measures. He defined the principles for coopera-
tion as ‘openness, honesty and transparency, convincing and authentic communication 
… This is the basis for trust among the members of the EWC, but, in turn, this means 
hard work and takes five to six years’ (Kollewe, 2005). In the following years, commu-
nication and activities increased considerably within the EEF. A process of ‘joint reflec-
tions’ among its members commenced, which dealt with the problems that came with the 
German employment pact and the experience with site selection practices. Also, joint 
activities such as solidarity actions led to positive experiences. Eventually, the view 
emerged that local or national negotiations would result in a downwards spiral. In order 
to prevent this, a common strategy was developed which resulted, first, in the signing of 
a ‘solidarity pledge’ in December 2005 by the employee representatives of the so-called 
Delta production locations, which produced models based on the Delta platform approach 
which allowed the company to shift production volumes flexibly (Bartmann and Dehnen, 
2009). Second, a GM Trade Union Coordination Group (TUCG) was founded, including 
national trade union officials as well as employee representatives from the production 
plants. Since then, the TUCG has been a forum for intensive dialogue and development 
of joint strategies.
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The EEF has been dubbed a ‘best practice’ EWC, mainly because up to 2009 it suc-
ceeded in negotiating eight European framework agreements (EFAs), in which far-reaching 
results were obtained, even superseding the competences of the German codetermination 
provisions (e.g. determining production capacities of the European plants). Moreover, it 
commenced a tight coordination of the representatives from different countries, which 
increased its power and put pressure on management to engage in negotiations. In 2001, for 
instance, it conducted several ‘European Days of Action’. Those massive protests were a 
reaction to cost-cutting measures, with protests and public demonstrations involving more 
than 40,000 GME employees all over Europe. Management, having previously achieved 
concessions without resistance, was clearly caught by surprise and agreed to sign an EFA, 
which precluded compulsory redundancies and guaranteed employment transfers to other 
production plants (Hertwig et al., 2011). The EEF has developed, in the face of resistance by 
management, from a deeply divided group to a united negotiating body. According to a 
Belgian member, ‘the most important level of employee representation at GME was the 
European Works Council’.
Since the middle of the 2000s, the EEF displayed strong coordination between its 
members and the trade unions at national and European level, with a high degree of 
activity and frequent, intense interaction. Moreover, the body developed a culture of 
trust and solidarity, which is supported by its decentralized structure. Even though the 
EEF chair and steering committee are located in Germany, as the country where the 
headquarters and most facilities are located, there are only six German representatives 
out of 29.
Ford of Europe and the FEWC
Ford Motor Company has been present in Europe for over a century, with imports from 
the United States and assembly plants since 1911. In the 1980s, the company was plagued 
by a cost and innovation crisis in the face of competition from Japan. In the next two 
decades, Ford responded with restructuring and a stronger orientation towards the capital 
market (Hancké, 2000), acquiring shares (Mazda in 1979, Hertz in 1987) and forming 
joint ventures (AutoEuropa with VW in Portugal in 1991). It attempted to enter the lux-
ury car segment by purchasing the long-established British brands Aston Martin (1987), 
Jaguar (1989) and Land Rover (2000) and sought increased market shares by taking over 
the passenger car division of the Volvo (1999). It also opened production facilities in 
Russia (2002) and Romania (2008). Under the global restructuring plan ‘Ford 2000’, the 
European headquarters moved in 1998 from Britain to Cologne, where the FEWC was 
already based. This step helped to end the historical rivalry between Ford of Britain and 
Ford of Germany and to stabilize employment relations under the new conditions of the 
EWC directive.
Previously, management had pursued a competitive approach in Europe that was quite 
similar to GME. For example, it used ‘productivity benchmarking across borders [put-
ting] more pressure on workers and trade unions to improve productivity’ and ‘began 
closing down smaller assembly plants’ to achieve cost reductions (Bonin and De Goey, 
2008: 31):
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The overall impact of restructuring during the 1970s was to redistribute final assembly 
activities, with a net reduction in the United Kingdom share, but maintenance of the German 
share. Faced with a crisis of employment relations in the United Kingdom, Ford’s ability to 
manage its spatial organization now permitted the firm to threaten relocation away from the 
trouble spots. (Bordenave, 1998: 216)
This strategy resulted in industrial conflicts initiated by the British trade unions; con-
versely, it inadvertently ‘strengthened the commitment of the German unions to “their” 
model of “industrial democracy”’ (Fetzer, 2008b: 31). The establishment of Ford of 
Europe in 1967 was the company’s answer to the institutionalization of free trade within 
the European Community. By applying its organizational model to European integration, 
Ford sensed a chance to profit from the economies of scale by organizing operations on 
the continental level in a more unified organization, as had already been done in North 
America in the 1960s (Bonin and De Goey, 2008; Fetzer, 2008b).
Despite radical restructuring at Ford, which began long before the 2007 crisis, the 
operating results in Europe continued to fluctuate throughout the 2000s and only slightly 
stabilized before 2008. In 1995, Ford combined its internal automotive supplier world-
wide into a new unit that was later renamed Visteon Automotive Systems. The opportu-
nity for the FEWC to enter into substantive negotiations with European management 
arose in 1999 because of the planned divestment of the components division into a new 
private company, Visteon Corporation. Globally, this involved 77,600 people: 52,000 in 
the United States and 19,800 in Europe (Roth and Kuckelkorn, 2000). Dealing with this 
situation, close cooperation with the American auto workers (UAW) became the first 
practical test for the FEWC (Mählmeyer, 2011). However, unlike GME, Ford of Europe 
turned to a cooperative approach to labour relations with the FEWC from the early 
2000s (Hauser-Ditz et al., 2010). Management decided that the EWC could benefit both 
employees and the company, as EU-wide binding agreements could lead to clear stand-
ards and reduce transaction costs.
Like the GME EEF, the FEWC is rather decentralized: Even though the chair and sec-
retary are located in Cologne, Germany holds only 5 of 18 seats (the same as the United 
Kingdom). Promoted by the highly integrative approach of the German chair, the EWC 
has developed a culture of trust and solidarity, which was also spurred by frequent meet-
ings (at least two full and two steering committee meetings each year) and communication 
among representatives in between. In terms of negotiations and agreements with manage-
ment, the EWC has been highly effective; up to 2010, there were 11 agreements covering 
topics from restructuring to social rights and responsibilities towards realignment of engi-
neering facilities, along with a number of official declarations issued unilaterally by the 
EWC. The 2000 ‘Agreement Governing the Separation of the Ford Visteon Organization’ 
was the first agreement concluded by any EWC in the car industry. Thus, within 4 years 
of the transposition of the EWC Directive, the FEWC, as a de facto negotiating partner, 
had developed attributes that went considerably beyond the original intentions.
Despite these achievements, in several incidents of significant restructuring at Ford of 
Europe, the FEWC played no major role: plant closures in Poland (1999) and the United 
Kingdom (Aveley, 2004), the sale of the Azambuja plant in Portugal to GM (2000) and 
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massive layoffs in the United Kingdom (Halewood, 2001, Dagenham, 2002, Leamington, 
2007). However, the failure to intervene in these cases was attributed to the fact that they 
lacked a ‘transnational dimension’; furthermore, FEWC had not been ‘authorized and 
requested by the appropriate national/local employee representation bodies to act on 
their behalf, with the aim of subsequently adopting and implementing the agreed arrange-
ments at national/local level’ (Ford/FEWC Memorandum of Understanding (Ford EWC, 
2010)). Accordingly, the FEWC had no right to intervene other than to apply an informa-
tion and consultation procedure at European level.
EWCs during the crisis
GME and the EEF: restructuring as a centrifugal force
The economic situation of GME deteriorated with the financial and economic crisis: its 
market share in Western Europe fell by more than 36 percent from 1990 to 2012. In addi-
tion, the insolvency of June 2009 aggravated the pressure on GME to cut costs. 
Management pursued a strategy of rigid cost reduction: to reduce overcapacity, it 
announced the closure of plants in Antwerp (2010) and Bochum (at the end of 2014), and 
the sale of Saab (2010). GME also cancelled shifts in almost all production locations and 
cut employment. Altogether, employment decreased by more than 30 percent, from 
64,485 in 2007 to 39,958 in 2011 (GME facts and figures, n.d.).
Although the EEF had learned to cope with crises over a period of nearly 10 years, the 
latest crisis added a new quality of challenges for cross-border employee representation 
that it was hardly able to handle. While previous crises put pressure on a small number 
of locations, nearly all locations were now affected or indeed put in jeopardy. Furthermore, 
with the insolvency of GME, uncertainty about the future of the European plants 
increased. The members of the EEF apparently underestimated the depth of the crisis: 
according to a UK member, ‘We never believed that General Motors would go bankrupt. 
Everyone believed that General Motors is too big to fail’. The closure of Antwerp was an 
open breach of management guarantees in the previous EFA.
The continuous rumours of further plant closures set a centrifugal process in motion 
in which solidarity collapsed. Local plants stuck to national solutions which seemed 
more promising in order to secure employment at their home plants than European 
cooperation. Negotiations over concessions took place in Germany, Poland and Spain. 
In May 2012, employee representatives in Ellesmere Port (the United Kingdom) and 
national union officers secretly negotiated with GME management: to secure produc-
tion of the new Astra, they accepted far-reaching concessions (freezing of wages, waiv-
ing of profit participation, flexible working time), which were accepted by 94 percent 
of the workforce. Those negotiations were perceived as a breach of the implicit con-
tracts of solidarity among employee representatives that had integrated the EEF and 
fostered its success for nearly 10 years. Hence, the return to local and national negotia-
tions, with single plants resorting to plant egoism, apparently led to a weakening of the 
culture of solidarity in general.
In some cases, the EEF was informed about the content and timing of negotiations; 
but instead of taking the lead, its role now was restricted to an ‘information hub’. 
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Communication among its members remained intense, and many meetings of the EEF 
and the working groups have taken place, but collective strategies or bargaining with 
management no longer derived from this cooperation. As one German interviewee put it, 
‘unfortunately, we went away from [European] framework agreements and back to mere 
information about the outcome of national negotiations’.
Disintegration of the EEF was also fostered by the restructuring of the company, 
which illustrates the direct influence of company structures on EWCs. As the number of 
locations was reduced (with the closure of Antwerp and the sale of Saab) and some rep-
resentatives left the body, its composition changed. As a consequence, on the one hand, 
the relatively equal distribution of seats, knowledge and power was reduced, and the 
dominance of the office in Rüsselsheim increased. On the other hand, personnel net-
works, relationships and trust that had carried the EEF and worked to reinforce its cul-
tural principles vanished.
Ford and the FEWC: personal trust eroding
Following a slight stabilization after many EU governments responded to the crisis by 
introducing scrappage subsidies, Ford of Europe entered a deep recession, with a loss of 
more than US$1.5 million in 2012. In October 2012, in order to reduce its capacity in 
Europe by one-fifth (Handelsblatt, 2013), Ford announced the closure of three plants in 
the EU, one in Belgium (Genk body and assembly plant by the end of 2014) and two in 
the United Kingdom (Southampton Transit plant and Dagenham stamping plant in 2013). 
Employment in Europe fell from 67,000 in 2007 to 46,000 in 2012. Hence, more than 
20,000 jobs were lost in Europe over a period of 5 years. Management pursued different 
measures to cut costs and reduce employment at different levels of the company. These 
included cost-saving in production, reducing the number of the shifts, early retirement 
plans and layoffs of temporary workers.
Most notably, management appeared to abandon its original cooperative approach 
towards the FEWC, attempting to play locations off against each other in local bargain-
ing. It only informed the FEWC after final decisions about plant closures had been taken, 
so that there was no chance to bargain. During the crisis, the function of the FEWC 
declined to a formal communication channel between the European and national levels, 
and to a discussion forum for the employee side. Most representatives seemed to prefer 
to bargain nationally or locally over the cost reduction plans, avoiding the European 
level: ‘each country inevitably does its own thing. And it’s very hard to expect people to 
do anything different. You know, it’s about protection’. Company-level agreements were 
almost simultaneously negotiated in Germany, Spain and Belgium by the local repre-
sentative bodies or by the trade unions, aiming at local employment protection.
FEWC coordination of local bargaining rounds at the European level might have led 
to a multilaterally beneficial outcome, but the process ultimately yielded a free-rider 
problem. To gain a relative advantage in comparison to others, some EWC members 
withheld the details of their negotiations or chose to present selected details only after-
wards, when any strategic talks on the employee side within the FEWC were precluded. 
The failure of some employee representatives to attend the FEWC meetings during the 
local negotiations was then interpreted by other members as a ‘confrontation avoidance 
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strategy’, thus increasing frictions. The lack of transparency on the employee side even-
tually bred mistrust and indifference towards further cooperation at the European level.
Another factor causing frictions was the dominant role of the German representatives. 
In private, some EWC members accused the Germans of not sharing any concrete num-
bers imposed by management other than reporting about the fact of negotiations: ‘They 
were talking about a horror list of 60 proposals, 30 proposals made by the management 
in Cologne, but the concrete details they did not communicate to the rest of EWC’. This 
was partially interpreted as a protectionist strategy for the sake of the German plants, 
which caused a search for hidden meanings and hindered open discussions even after the 
conclusion of the collective agreements at plant level. While secretly criticized for not 
using their strength to support their European colleagues, the Germans seemed annoyed 
by the lack of initiative and ‘victim mentality’ of some EWC members.
Plummeting demand following the end of the national scrappage schemes, coupled 
with the overcapacity of the automotive market in Europe, raised great anxieties among 
FEWC members (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2006). Especially those from outside 
Germany expressed strong demands for more fairness during the production distribution 
process ‘so that no one country gets 90 percent of the work, while a small country next 
to it only 10 percent … The volumes are always dictating how you are in Europe’. The 
decline in cooperative practice and the erosion of trust and solidarity can be traced back 
to a number of intertwined factors. First, the crisis revealed a new quality in terms of 
threats for locations and employees. Many of the EWC members interviewed were aware 
of the economic need to close one production facility, given the overcapacity problem of 
Ford in Europe. Yet, the decision to close the Genk plant in Belgium with production 
relocation to Valencia and two plants in the United Kingdom with production transfer to 
Turkey came as a shock. Because of the difficult European market and decreasing profits 
in Europe, FEWC members had anticipated some radical measures in one country, but 
plant closures in two countries and of more than one plant had not been expected.
Unlike in GME, the FEWC not previously been confronted with multiple, simultane-
ous complete plant closures accompanied by production transfers, and the national 
employee representatives did not trust their EWC to work out an acceptable joint solu-
tion. They would, moreover, not be willing to transfer part of their local or national 
power to the European level for these purposes, as the negotiating mandate requires. 
Although realizing the need to mobilize the necessary efforts at the European level, 
EWC members strongly believed that the instruments available at national level were 
better suited to deal with the problems:
The national employee representatives will first inform themselves and try to save their plant. 
Only afterwards they will think of helping the others by saying, it could have come worse … 
The strongest will try to pick the best piece of cake … Solidarity lasts for as long as one’s own 
interests are not salient.
An important catalyst for the erosion of trust was, somewhat as at GME, a change in 
membership composition. Several long-term representatives had left the FEWC, some 
like the former German chair Dieter Hinkelmann because of retirement, and their replace-
ments held sceptical views about Europe. For instance, they were not aware that the 
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FEWC had exceeded the limits of the directive with substantive negotiations. Most were 
against transferring responsibilities to the European level and did not communicate any 
expectations other than gaining access to central management. Lack of continuity within 
the FEWC diminished personal trust between the members, and caused a rift between the 
long-standing and new members. Overall, the motivation among EWC members to 
intensify their efforts for the common good varied significantly.
Discussion
Reacting to the crisis, management in the two companies developed strategies to cope 
with decreasing demand, overcapacity and rising costs. These had an enormous impact 
on employees throughout Europe. Compared to previous periods of restructuring, the 
recent crisis differed in a number of aspects. In each company many locations were 
affected, and more far-reaching measures were taken, which threatened the survival of a 
multiplicity of plants and jobs. Plant closures were not new in GME, but there were now 
accumulating problems and even the survival of the company was in question. The crisis 
raised considerably the level of problems to which employees and the EEF had been 
accustomed.
The two EWCs encountered changes in their structures and coordination patterns but 
in different ways. Previously, both EWCs displayed differences and similarities. They 
operate in US-based MNCs, and therefore there is no clear ‘home country’ inside the EU; 
however, both companies have a strong foothold in Germany. The most noteworthy 
differences concern the nature of labour relations and challenges that stemmed from 
restructuring. While at Ford the EWC and management had established a cooperative 
relationship, labour relations at GME had been notoriously conflictual. The FEWC had 
not faced cross-country restructuring, whereas the EEF was constantly confronted with 
crisis and downsizing schemes. However, those differences do not appear to affect devel-
opments during the crisis.
Since 2007, there has been increased activity in both EWCs, with enhanced commu-
nication, a growing number of meetings and increasing information flows. Yet, the out-
comes that resulted from those activities differed from before. Both EWCs fell back on 
national and local policy solutions, ‘downgrading’ the EWC from a negotiating actor to 
a service centre or information hub. Accordingly, the developments in both represent a 
‘stagnation’ of cross-border employee representation and a ‘disintegration’ of the EWC 
because the structural and cultural basis for cross-border employee representation suf-
fered. In contrast to earlier incidents of company restructuring, the EWCs could no 
longer bargain and sign agreements collectively. What factors explain these develop-
ments? We consider five of these.
Company structure and coordination
Two findings appear important. First, reactions of the two EWCs were not triggered by 
the financial crisis; they had an effect only through the reactions chosen by the compa-
nies. Second, the company restructuring directly affected the composition of both EWCs, 
which altered the foundations of trust and solidarity. Changes in the EWC personnel 
238 European Journal of Industrial Relations 23(3)
were partly triggered by shifts in the company structure, such as plant closures. At GME, 
wide-ranging restructuring interacted with layoffs. One consequence was that the num-
ber of representatives decreased and that some plants were no longer eligible to send 
representatives.
Culture
Both EWCs clearly demonstrate what happens when widely shared norms of solidar-
ity, mutual understanding and visions of a joint mission falter (Greer and Hauptmeier, 
2012; Pernicka et al., 2014; Whittall et al., 2007). The erosion of EWC culture in large 
part explains the shrinking role of both EWCs at GME and Ford of Europe and the 
decrease in their output. In contrast to recent assessments of the GME case (Pernicka 
et al., 2014), we argue that norms of solidarity, even if maintained as a broad concept 
in the minds of the actors, no longer shape the actions of EWC representatives. In 
EWCs, shared norms seem to rely on a small number of individuals; as the Ford case 
illustrates, they tend to fade when the actors committed to them disappear. However, 
as cultural rules such as trust and solidarity have to be reproduced in constant action 
(Giddens, 1984), it seems unlikely that the EWCs can easily return to their pre-crisis 
state.
Actor strategies and internal dynamics
During the crisis, groups of representatives in both EWCs chose strategies that devi-
ated from previous practice. Actors adhered to plant egoism, choosing nationally 
focussed strategies over the previous European ones. Changes in personnel, partly 
resulting from company restructuring, partly from retirement, weakened both EWCs. 
Many long-standing members disappeared, including key figures who had worked as 
an integrating force: like Klaus Franz, chair of the GME EEF, who had helped initiate 
the solidarity approach.
In terms of path dependency, the cases suggest that the crisis and management strat-
egies disrupted the former ‘successful’ trajectories of both EWCs. The influence of 
paths was more or less broken because the focal actors who had carried the solidaristic 
culture had left. At Ford, the situation appears to resemble a ‘shock effect’ (Koukiadaki 
et al., 2016) because representatives were not used to so severe a situation. At GME, 
the path mirrors a blend of ‘acceleration’ and ‘shock’ effects. In the face of the crisis, 
representatives activated the tried and tested patterns: increasing communication, 
meetings and discussions. However, they scarcely succeeded because the crisis brought 
more severe and fundamental challenges; the future of the company and the EWC was 
uncertain, which came as a ‘shock’ for the representatives and employees. As continu-
ity of interaction was no longer self-understood (Axelrod, 1984), national solutions 
appeared a more effective strategy than transnational cooperation. The absence of (for-
mer) leading actors with their integrative vision and capacity, who might have pointed 
to alternative transnational solutions, paved the way to cultural disintegration and 
erosion of trust.
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Conclusion
We have attempted to improve our understanding of how EWCs deal with situations of 
crisis, and more generally of the factors that influence EWC activation and the output of 
cross-border employee representation. We have indicated the fragile nature of cross-border 
employee representation, which depends on trust, personal networks and cooperative 
attitudes of committed actors. When personal networks falter, actors may tend to rely on 
national institutions. Arguably, the basis for the effective EWCs to develop was personal 
confidence, strongly connected to individual relationships (Telljohann, 2009), and less 
‘system confidence’ towards formal institutions such as the EWC Directive. In contrast to 
previous studies, our findings suggest that abandoning cooperative strategies does not 
come as a result of cost–benefit decisions by rational actors; rather, structural conditions 
pave the way for the developments observed, and the high degree of uncertainty in com-
pany globalization makes it hard for representatives to calculate what the best option is.
The future of the EWCs is uncertain. Given that the EEF and FEWC have been 
regarded as ‘best practice’ models, have the complexity and severity of the crisis irre-
trievably destroyed these former well-functioning EWCs? Did the loss of trust damage 
their culture of solidarity so that it cannot be reconstructed? Or may cross-border 
employee representation revive? It appears that cross-border employee representation in 
these companies may have to take a step back in order to establish trust and commitment, 
for instance, by integrating and ‘teaching’ the new representatives. Very likely, recovery 
will depend on committed persons, who are eager to re-establish the former structures, 
and probably even on ‘critical events’, which may give the EWCs a sense of achieve-
ment (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012).
Two further questions derive from our research. How can EWCs formulate strategic 
responses to the challenges posed by management strategies? Here, intense and dense 
communication among representatives appears to be an important condition. However, 
as the threats we have observed have put the very basis of these EWCs in jeopardy, the 
more important question seems to be how EWCs can maintain stability, in their struc-
tures and their ‘cultural’ achievements, even when the personal foundations erode, when 
long-standing and trusted representatives leave the body. Here, one may think of particu-
lar measures: first, increasing the number of delegates would broaden the personal basis, 
so that the EWC becomes less vulnerable to fluctuation. However, increasing the number 
of mandates will raise management opposition given increased costs, and it may even 
hinder the evolution of relations when the size of the EWC exceeds a certain limit and 
representatives remain ‘anonymous’ to each other.
Second, an elaborated training system for new EWC members could foster integration 
and ‘organizational learning’, as knowledge about the EWC’s achievements, expectations 
and custom and practice can spread more easily. Third, personal trust rises with increasing 
interaction and communication inside a EWC, which may be achieved by establishing, as 
a second ‘tier’ underneath the original EWC, (small) working groups, where members 
interact more frequently. Fourth, an increase in mandate duration may foster long-term 
membership and reduce fluctuation. However, in some countries, EWC delegates are 
assigned through democratic election, which should not be undervalued. While these issues 
may be subject to negotiations between unions or EWCs and management, they may also 
address the European Commission agenda for a second recast or revision of the Directive.
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